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Abstract
We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to
identify the causal e¤ect of higher incentives for innovation on rm organizational features. We
nd that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on technologically
advanced rms, i.e., rms that were a-priori above the industry median in terms of technology
adoption. While there is an overall increase in managersshare of compensation, this increase is
about 1.6-1.7% more for high-tech rms. This di¤erence can be attributed to a larger increase
in performance pay for high-tech rms. The reform also leads to a signicant increase in number
of managerial layers and number of divisions for high-tech rms relative to low-tech rms, but
only the latter e¤ect is correlated with the di¤erential change in managerial compensation.
Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger IP protection leads to an increase in both within-rm
and between-rm wage inequality, with more robust evidence for between-rm inequality.
JEL classications: D21, D23, L23, O1, O34
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature studying how rm organization is a¤ected by di¤erent kinds of macro-
economic shocks  drop in tari¤s due to trade agreements (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010), export
market participation (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Keller and Olney, 2017; Caliendo et
al., 2017), input-trade liberalization (Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018), etc. In this paper, we study
how the imposition of stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) a¤ects various dimensions of
the structure of rms. We analyze an exogenous change in the Indian patents regime brought
about by a landmark legislation, the The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002. While Indian
rms could only patent new production processes, this act allowed rms to claim patents for new
products. This change substantially strengthened property rights over innovation and signicantly
raised rms incentive to innovate. We study how a large cross section of Indian manufacturing
rms responded to this Act in terms of changes in organizational structure. To the best of our
knowledge, we believe that our work is the rst to look at how a change in IPR a¤ects rm structure
as well as wage inequality.1
Our aim is to establish a causal link between rm structure and innovation, and examine exactly
what features do rms believe are the most conducive to innovation performance. A large body
of evidence, both in management and economics, demonstrates that organizational structure is
a crucial determinant of a rms ability to innovate.2 However, as Azoulay and Lerner (2013)
point out in their detailed survey on the topic, the existing empirical literature largely focuses on
the correlation between organizational structure and innovation performance and fails to credibly
identify causal channels.3 A major contribution of our work is to identify a suitable quasi-natural
experiment which is a change in intellectual property rights (IPR) regime that enhances rms
future incentives to innovate. We rely on the simple fact that rms react to these incentives
and modify their organizational structure based on their capabilities. This allows us to interpret
1Kamal and Lovely (2013), which looks at the e¤ect of Chinas WTO accession on formation of joint ventures, is
the only other paper we found that relates IPR regime to rm structure.
2 In particular, various indicators of innovation inputs or performance have been shown to be correlated with
di¤erent aspects of rm structure, e.g., rm size (Schumpeter, 1942; Cohen and Levin, 1989) compensation schemes
(Manso, 2011; Amabile, 1993 and 1996; Teece, 1994), structure of employee contracts (Azoulay et al., 2011), product
scope (Brugelman, 1984), level of vertical integration (Azoulay, 2004), degree of centralization (Argyres and Silverman,
2004), number of layers or more generally, organizational complexity (Teece, 1994; Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005).
3An essential di¢ culty facing large-sample empirical research has been an inability to distinguish between asso-
ciation and causation, and, in some cases, a failure even to think carefully about this distinction. Azoulay and
Lerner (2013), Handbook of Organizational Economics, pp 576.
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the observed rm-level responses to the The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 as those that
enhance innovation potential.
We analyze rmsresponse to this exogenous change in IPR regime in three di¤erent dimensions
of organizational structure: (i) relative demand for managers vis-a-vis non-managers measured as
share of compensation, (ii) extent of performance pay for managers, and (iii) organizational design,
i.e., number of management layers and number of divisions. We nd a sharp heterogeneity in
rms response to the IPR shock: the rms that were a-priori technologically advanced at the time
of the reform had signicantly larger increase in each of these three dimensions relative to the
technologically backward rms. An important implication of our nding is that imposition of a
stronger IP regime increases wage inequality both within-rms and between-rms, with the latter
e¤ect being signicantly stronger.
Indias patent policy started to shift towards greater protection of intellectual property rights
as a result of the emergence of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs, hereafter) in
the WTO (after 1995). India got a 10-year transition period to implement a TRIPs-complaint IPR
regime, but during this period there were several inconclusive rounds of discussion in the parliament
due to opposition from various sections of the political establishment (Reddy and Chandrashekaran,
2017). Eventually, in June 2002, the Indian parliament passed the second amendment to the 1970
Act known as The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 38 of 2002).4 It proposed a new
denition of the term inventionwhich changed patent rights from process to product innovations,
increased the term of patents from 14 to 20 years, brought all elds of technology under the ambit of
patents and streamlined the process of patent grant. This act ended the earlier policy uncertainty
and provided the necessary impetus to rms to make the xed investments in new technology to
harness the benets of the new IP regime. Figure 1 demonstrates a sharp increase in investments
in technology adoption by a large sample of Indian manufacturing rms.
By conferring monopoly rights over new products, the Act signicantly raised the payo¤ to
innovation. Innovation involves a whole range of activities that are intensive in managerial talent:
research, conceptualization and development of new products, branding and marketing the product
and so on. Innovation presents rms with more complex problems, and this raises the value of
managers as problem-solvers (Garicano, 2000). Therefore, under the new IPR regime, one would
4This Act came into force on 20th May 2003 with the introduction of the new Patent Rules, 2003 by replacing
the earlier Patents Rules, 1972.
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expect relative returns to managerial skills as well as demand for managers to increase across all
rms. However, the rms that had a-priori higher investments in technology had comparatively
larger gains from innovation either because they were more likely to win patent races or because
of reduced marginal cost of additional investment. The increase in relative returns to managerial
inputs would be higher in such rms, and they would would also have stronger incentives to make
complementary changes in their organizational structure.5 In order to see whether these hypotheses
are true, we use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 as the quasi-natural experiment to investigate
the e¤ects of the change in IPR regime in terms of demand for managers and rm structure.
The empirical literature on organizational structure of rms is scarce due to limited data avail-
ability. We employ a rm level panel dataset from the PROWESS database provided by the Centre
for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE). The dataset contains direct measures of spend-
ing on several dimensions of technology adoption, namely R&D expenditure and royalty payments
for technology transfer, allowing us to build a comprehensive and accurate measure of investment
in technology. It also reports detailed labour compensation, divided into managerial and non-
managerial, with the former divided into several management layers (Chakraborty and Raveh,
2018). In addition, the dataset provides exports, imports, capital employed and other important
rm and industry characteristics. The panel format of the data enables us to have a dynamic spec-
ication in which technological investments and other rm decisions can potentially a¤ect demand
for managers.
We begin our analysis by dividing rms into two groups, high-techand low-tech, following
Branstetter et al. (2006) and applying to our case. We classify a rm as high-tech, if a rms average
expenditure on R&D and technology transfer between 1990-2001 is greater than the median in the
corresponding industry. By doing so, we create a treatmentand controlgroup where the control
group is the low-tech rms. There are two empirical challenges in establishing a causal relationship
between change in IP regimes and relative demand for managers complemented with technology
adoption: (a) unobservable characteristics of a rm might drive both the demand for managers and
investment in technology posing challenges to identication; and (b) a higher share of managers
may itself a¤ect the likelihood of undertaking new investments in technology, (i.e., the reverse
5Aghion et al. (2017) nds that a positive export shock raises innovation more for more productive rms. The
channel, in their case, is that more productive rms are less a¤ected more by competition from domestic rms in
the destination country. We have a similar channel where innovative e¤ort is more likely to be successful for more
productive rms.
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causality problem). We use a quasi-natural experiment in terms of patent policy change to tackle
the former, whereas for the latter, we use a di¤-in-di¤ approach which exploits the timing of rm
level decisions to pin down the direction of causality. The di¤-in-di¤ approach also isolates the
e¤ect of the change in the innovation policy on organization from the e¤ect of globalization and
other activities that might be complementary to policy change. We expect that a stronger patent
policy would induce a higher demand for managers in the a-priori high-tech rms than the low-tech
rms (given the complementarity between technological investments and managerial inputs).
Table 1 compares high-tech and low-tech rms before and after the 2002 IP reform on various
characteristics, such as technology adoption, managerial compensation, capital employed, trade
(exports and imports) and sales. We calculate the mean share of these observable characteristics
over the gross value-added of a rm. We see that in the pre-reform period, the high-tech and low-
tech rms di¤er signicantly in terms of technology adoption but not on other major observable
characteristics. This points out that di¤erences between treatedand controlgroup of rms arises
after the reform.
Figure 2 plots technology adoption for our sample of Indian rms for the period 1990-2006
by dividing into high-tech and low-tech rms. The gure clearly shows similar trend for high-tech
and low-tech rms before the adoption of the patent reform but quite the opposite after. The
technology adoption expenditure for the high-tech rms nearly doubled between 2002 and 2006,
whereas for low-tech rms it shows a decline. Figure 3 plots the average share of managerial
compensation in total compensation for the entire sample of rms and Figure 4 does the same
for high-tech and low-tech rms separately. We nd that while there was an increasing trend in
managersshare of compensation in both types of rms, the increase in the high-tech group was
approximately double that of the low-tech rms. These two diagrams suggest a possible association
between patent reform, technology adoption and demand for managers and paves the way to provide
causal inferences.
In our analysis, we emphasize three important questions: (a) how imposition of stronger patent
rights impacts the demand for di¤erent kinds of workers (in our case managers and non-managers)
di¤erently; (b) how this change in relative demand is reected between- and within-rms; and (c)
how it impacts the organizational design of a rm.
Our paper has three sets of results. The rst part estimates the reduced form e¤ect of change
in innovation policy complemented with technological adoption of rms on the relative demand for
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managers. We nd a remarkably persistent statistically signicant and economically meaningful
positive e¤ect of The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 on the relative demand for managers, both
at the intensive and extensive margin. Our benchmark estimations indicate that The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2002 led to an increase in the share of managerial compensation of the high-
tech vis-à-vis the low-tech rms by around 1.6-1.7%. The e¤ect is robust to various controls,
specications, estimation techniques and time-periods.
Our second result points out that technologically-advanced rms use sharper incentives to mo-
tivate managers as a result of the reform. There is considerable debate in the literature about how
and whether incentives motivate innovation and creativity (Holmstrom, 1989). Earlier work (e.g.,
Teece, 1994; Amabile, 1996) suggests that high-powered incentives stie creativity and innovation,
whereas current literature (e.g., Manso, 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2011; Azoulay et al., 2011) focus
on forms of long-term incentive mechanisms that motivate innovation. In our case, we nd that
increased incentive pay is necessitated by the particular way that IP reform a¤ects innovation in-
centives. A strong IP regime induces patent races, which reward not just the innovation but also
the time to innovate. Motivating quicker innovation requires aggressive managerial incentives.
Lastly, we nd that the span of control of managers as proxied by the number of product varieties
increases more for technologically advanced rms. We interpret this as evidence of establishment
of new divisions due to new product development. Moreover, the di¤erential increase in share
of managerial compensation is highly correlated with such horizontal expansion.6 This result is
consistent with the idea that decentralized rm structure is more suitable to innovation (Caroli
and Van Reenen, 2001).
Our ndings suggests that stronger patent rights leads to an increase in inequality of two
di¤erent kinds: (i) the technological gap between high-tech and low-tech rms increases; and (ii)
both within- and between- rm wage inequality increases. Two papers point out such increase
in gap between di¤erent groups as a result of di¤erent kind of shocks. Aghion et al. (2005)
while investigating the relationship between competition and innovation highlights that the average
technological distance between the technological-leaders and -laggards increases with competition.
In a slightly di¤erent context, Galor and Moav (2000) points out that an increase in the rate of
6There is a debate about whether vertical hierarchies are conducive to innovation. While some papers (e.g., Teece,
1994; Caroli and Van Reenen; 2001) advocate that delayering and decentralization are conducive to innovation, others
(e.g., Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and Wulf, 2007) suggest the opposite. While we nd a signicant increase
in vertical layers due to the reform, there is no evidence that this vertical expansion contributes to the increase in
the share of managerial income.
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technological progress raises the return to ability and simultaneously generates an increase in wage
inequality between and within groups of skilled and unskilled workers (Kline et al., 2017).
There are at least two channels through which innovation policy a¤ects rm organization
through technology adoption. First, a stronger patent protection lead rms to invest in exploring
new avenues like product development, research activities, marketing activities for brand develop-
ment, etc. all of which lead to horizontal expansion of a rm (Teece, 1986, 1994). Second, existing
processes are also pushed closer to the technological frontier through use of more R&D expendi-
ture, technology transfer, import of capital goods, etc. Both these e¤ects increase the demand for
managers and result in technological deepening. Notice that due to the inherent complementarities
in technological advancement, both these e¤ects are stronger in rms that are already technolog-
ically superior. As a result, we observe that a stronger patent regime leads to an increase in the
inequality across rms in technology intensiveness as well as share of managerial compensation in
total compensation.
The paper contributes to several strands of literature. We directly add to the literature on how
di¤erent kinds of shocks can induce changes in rm structure e.g., technology adoption (Bresnahan
et al., 2000), communication technology (Garicano, 2000, Garicano and Heaton, 2010), globalization
(Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Spanos, 2017; Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018), etc. In our case, this
exogenous shock comes from an exogenous change in innovation policy. A signicant portion of
literature argues that some kind of technological adoption is complement to organizational change
and raises the employment shares or relative demand for skilled workers over unskilled workers
(Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001) or managers over workers (Lee and Shin, 2017). However, as
mentioned above all the studies establishes a correlation, while we show causal relation between
innovation and organizational change.
The paper also relates to the growing literature investigating the impact of innovation policy
on wage inequality. Boler (2015) uses a R&D tax credit scheme in Norway to demonstrate that
innovation signicantly increases the demand for skilled workers and the increase in demand is
due to a change in within-rm skill-biased productivity growth. While our results are similar, we
nd that between-rm inequality plays a larger role than within-rm inequality in explaining the
increase in relative demand for managers. Moreover, we complement this literature by analyzing
how rm organization changes because of a shift in the innovation policy. Kline et al. (2017)
analyzes how patent applications can induce inequality in worker compensation among U.S. rms.
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In a similar context, Aghion et al. (2015) uses data on US states to show that top income inequality
is (at least partly) driven by innovation. In a di¤erent context, Song et al. (2016) show that a
large majority of the overall inequality is driven by increasing dispersion between, not within, rms
which is similar to our nding.
Third, our nding that a change in IPR regime works through the capital-skill complemen-
tarity channel has a parallel in the literature on the trade-induced skill-biased technical change
(Acemoglu, 2003; Michaels et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2017), particularly in developing economies
(Amiti and Cameron, 2012; Raveh and Reshef, 2016; Maloney and Molina, 2016). In a similar
context, Ugur and Mitra (2017) maps the qualitative and empirical evidences to report that the
e¤ect of technology adoption on employment is skill-biased and more likely to be observed when
technology adoption favours product as opposed to process innovation. Vashisht (2017) examines
the impact of technology on employment and skill demand for the Indian manufacturing sector and
demonstrates that adoption of new technology has increased the demand for high skilled workers.
This nding is consistent with ours, as we show that higher technology adoption leads to demand
for more managers.
Fourth, we contribute to the debate on whether sharp incentives lead to greater innovative
output. Holmstrom (1989) identies the di¢ culties in motivating innovative e¤ort. Teece (1994)
and Amabile (1996) hold that sharp incentives may be inimical to innovation. Empirical work by
Lerner and Wulf (2007) and Kline et al. (2017) nds that innovation is associated with long term
(rather than short term) incentives. On the contrary, we uncover strong evidence that technolog-
ically advanced rms provide sharper incentives as a result of the IPR shock. Such incentives are
provided to the middle level managers (i.e., divisional heads and functional heads) who are typically
responsible for new product development. Moreover, we nd that such incentives are associated
with higher innovative output in at least two senses: the high-tech rms introduce more product
lines as well as le more patent claims due to the IPR shock.
Finally, the paper relates to the e¤ect of IPR reform on innovative activities of countries,
industries, rms. The e¤ect of an IPR reform on innovation performance has been addressed at
multiple levels: country (Park and Lippoldt, 2004; Chen and Puttitatun, 2005; Branstetter et al.,
2006; Qian, 2007), industry-rm (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Allred and Park, 2007; Yang
and Maskus, 2009; Lo, 2011). We extend and complement this literature by looking at the e¤ect
of an IPR reform on within- and between-rm dimensions of management and organization. In
8
addition, it also contributes to the literature on the e¤ect of the specic 2002 IPR reform in India.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the details of the reform. We provide
details about the data, in Section 3. The empirical strategy and exogeneity of the reform is discussed
in Section 4. In Section 5, we report our results, showing the e¤ect of higher incentives to innovation
on demand for managers through higher technology adoption and how does it simultaneously a¤ects
other aspects of rm organization. We discuss the likely channels through which our e¤ects work
in Section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The pre-1990s intellectual property regime in India was governed by the The Indian Patent Act,
1970, which was aimed at preventing foreign monopolies.7 According to the Act, only process and
not product innovations were granted patents. The term for patents was xed at 14 years (and
only 5-7 years in chemicals and drugs) while the international standard was 20 years. Several areas
were excluded from patents, and the government could use patented inventions to prevent scarcity.
Such a system allowed domestic rms to imitate foreign products with a slightly di¤erent process,
thus expropriating value from investment in product innovation made by foreign rms. The 1970
Patent Act soon started facing international resistance as discussions on free trade started getting
linked to IPR.
In 1991, India ran into its much-discussed balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis and turned to
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. The IMF conditioned its assistance on the
implementation of a major adjustment program that included several liberalization steps and be-
coming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 1994, India signed the Marrakesh
Agreement and agreed to be bound by TRIPs. It enabled India to get a 10-year moratorium period
(1995-2005) to transition to a stronger, TRIPs-compliant IPR regime which would respect product
patents (for details see Chaudhuri, 2005). This transition had several hiccups with uncertainty
around the implementation of the new regime. As we explain below, the uncertainty cleared only
7The Patent Act of 1970 was partly based on the recommendations of Patent Enquiry Committee (1948-50) and
the Ayyangar Committee (1957-59), which made two major observations: (i) the Indian patent system has failed to
stimulate and encourage the development and exploitation of new inventions for industrial purposes in the country;
and (ii) foreign patentees were acquiring patents not in the interests of the domestic economy but with the objective of
protecting an export market from competition of rival manufacturers. The reports also concluded that the foreigners
held 80-90% of the patents in India and were exploiting the system to achieve monopolistic control of the market
(Ramanna, 2002).
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by 2002, and this provides us the structural break that we exploit in our study.
Indias initial transition started with the failed The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994
which was tabled by a weak coalition government, amending The Indian Patent Act, 1970. It
allowed for a mailboxprovision through which rms could le product patent applications which
would be reviewed on a priority basis as and when India amends its patent laws to comply with
TRIPs. However, uncertainty remained about the exact time frame of this transition. Simulta-
neously, The Patents (Amendment) Bill, 1995 was introduced in the Parliament to enforce the
ordinance.8 As per Indian law, a bill must be passed by both houses of the parliament. While the
Upper House passed it, the Indian parliament was dissolved due to ideological di¤erences between
members of the ruling coalition once the bill was in the lower house of the parliament. The Patents
(Amendment) Bill, 1995 automatically lapsed leaving the uncertainty around IPR transition alive.
The United States led a complaint against India to the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) of
the WTO in 1996 for failing to abide by the TRIPs.9 India lost this case, despite an appeal,
with the U.S. further bolstered by a European Community complaint. India then negotiated with
the U.S. to amend its patent law by April 1999.10 Finally, in order to honour this commitment
made to the DSB, India implemented The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 despite civil society
concerns. This amended Act had the provision for ling of applications for product patents in
the areas of drugs, pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals, though the applications were only to be
reviewed after 31st December, 2004.11 However, this Act came as a compromise in what was still
an uncertain environment around patent policy and was basically a post factum of the failed Patent
(Amendment) Bill, 1995. It failed to encourage much innovation.
Throughout the nineties, patent policy in India was subject to a political tug-of-war. While a
large section of the INC (Indian National Congress, the ruling party during the rst half of the
decade) had been sympathetic to liberal patent laws, there was sti¤ resistance from the opposition
8 In Indian constitutional law, ordinances are valid for only six months from the day of promulgation, or six weeks
from the day Indian Parliament reconvenes after the ordinance is promulgated.
9See: World Trade Organization, Chronological list of disputes cases, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm and World Trade Organization, India
 Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/1, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm.
10Dispute Settlement Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products -
Reasonable period of time for implementation of the DSBs recommendations, WT/DSB/M/45 (Jun. 10, 1998), at
16.
11Further, the applicants could be allowed Exclusive Marketing Rights to sell or distribute these products in India,
but subject to fullment of certain conditions.
10
as well as parts of INC. In April 1993, a parliamentary committee tasked to study the draft
proposal by Arthur Dunkel on Uruguay round of GATT documented the strong unwillingness of
India to comply with TRIPs,12 although its recommendations were rejected by the ordinance of
1994. The BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), after coming to power in 1998, abandoned its opposition
and adopted a pro-patent position. By the turn of the millennium, a majority within both the
BJP and the INC favoured a more liberal patent policy.13 By this time, a domestic constituency
had also emerged in support of the patent reform. The support occurred at di¤erent levels: rst,
the impact of liberal ideas regarding economic reforms slowly led to a more westernized notion of
IPR; second, by this time a more modern, professionally managed and technologically advanced
segment of industry had developed in India; third, top Indian research and scientic institutes (e.g.,
Council of Scientic and Industrial Research, CSIR) felt that they could benet from patents rather
than publications (Ramanna; 2002; Choudhury and Khanna, 2014).14
Given this background, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 laid the foundation and provided
the necessary impetus to change the intellectual property regime in India. According to the Con-
troller General of Patents, Design and Trademarks, Govt. of India, The Patents (Amendment) Act,
2002,15 replaced the earlier patent rules implemented by the 1970 Act.16 This legislation proposed
a new denition of the term invention, introduced product patents in all elds of technology,
increased the term of patents from 14 to 20 years (complying with TRIPs), limited the scope for
the government to use patented inventions. This Act really broadened the scope for the implemen-
tation of the TRIPs complying IPR regime that India was committed to adopting.17 Three years
later India was able to push this second legislation further with the addition of 3(d), the compulsory
12 India, Rajya Sabha, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, DRAFT DUNKEL PROPOSALS at 46
(December 14, 1994)
13For details, see Parties undecided on Patents Bill, Economic Times, December 21, 1998; BJP Eases Stand on
Swadeshi Plank, Backs Government Policy, Deccan Herald, January 5, 1999; Congress Support to Ensure Passage
of Patents Bill, Economic Times, December 23, 1998.
14ASSOCHAM (Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry) also gave a written submission to the Committee
on the need for phased introduction of product patents in India and pointed out that it was of the view that to attract
increasing ow of Foreign Direct Investment, it is important for India to strengthen the patent system. This will
ensure higher interaction in R&D as well as ow of foreign capital.
15This act came into force on 20th May, 2003
16http://www.ipindia.nic.in/history-of-indian-patent-system.htm
17 It additionally introduced the Bolarexception, inspired by US law exempting manufacturers from infringement
if they develop products, conduct research and submit test data for regulatory purposes. A joint parliamentary
committee was constituted which submitted a report to the lower house of the Indian parliament; while its research
was thorough, political circumstances ensured that the 2002 bill faced lesser di¢ culties than the earlier legislation
and thus The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 was enacted.
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licensing provision, and implemented The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 to comply with all the
provisions of TRIPs (see Chatterjee et al., 2015 for more details on 3(d)).
Our detailed discussion of the events suggests that there was a signicant amount of uncertainty
in transition to a stronger IPR regime, which essentially cleared up with The Patents (Amendment)
Act, 2002. We utilize this Act as a quasi-natural experiment to understand how the change in the
intellectual property rights regime a¤ects a rms structure.. We conduct a variety of exogeneity
checks (explained in detail in Section 4.1) to ensure that we address any confounding impact of
potential ex-ante industry- or rm-level changes that may have inuenced the 2002 IPR reform.
3 Dataset
We exploit a dataset of Indian manufacturing rms drawn from the PROWESS database, con-
structed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The dataset has previously
been used by Khandelwal and Topalova (2011), Ahsan and Mitra (2014) and Chakraborty and
Raveh (2018), among others. The dataset accounts for more than 70% of the economic activity
in the organized industrial sector, and 75% (95%) of corporate (excise duty) taxes collected by
the Indian Government (Goldberg et al., 2010). All variables are measured in Millions of Indian
Rupees (INR), deated to 2005 using the industry-specic Wholesale Price Index, and are outlined
in Appendix A (Data). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables.
The database contains information on approximately 27,400 publicly listed companies, all within
the organized sector, of which almost 11,500 are in the manufacturing sector.18 It reports direct
measures on a vast array of rm level characteristics including sales, exports, imports, R&D expen-
ditures, technology transfer, production factors employed, gross value added, assets, ownership, and
others. The dataset covers both large and small enterprises; data for the former types is collected
from balance sheets, whereas that for the latter ones is based on CMIEs periodic surveys of smaller
companies.
PROWESS presents several features that makes it particularly appealing for the purposes of our
study as compared to other available sources, such as the Indian Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI), for instance. First, unlike other sources, the PROWESS data is in e¤ect a panel of rms,
18While placed according to the 4-digit 2008 National Industrial Classication (NIC) level, rms are reclassied to
the 2004 level to facilitate matching with the industry-level characteristics. Hence, all industry-level categorization
made throughout the paper are based on the 2004 NIC classication.
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enabling us to study their behavior over time; specically, the (unbalanced) sample covers 108 (4-
digit NIC) manufacturing industries that belongs to 22 (2-digit NIC) larger ones,19 over the period
of 1990-2006.
Second, the feature of the data set upon which our study is based, is that it disaggregates
compensation data by managers and non-managers, with a further disaggregation of compensation
to wages and bonuses. Additionally, the managers are divided into two groups: directors and exec-
utives.20 The mon-managers are dened as those who do not manage other employees. Directors
are dened as managers without executive powers, as opposed to executives who do possess such
responsibilities. Executives include, for instance, the CEO, CFO, and Chairman, whereas Directors
may include positions such as Divisional Managers.21 In e¤ect, we consider directors to be middle
management, whereas executives are the top management.
A key related issue is regarding the accuracy and consistency of the data. Chakraborty and
Raveh (2018) compares the compensation data for 20 randomly selected rms (representing both
relatively large and small ones) from PROWESS with that of those reported in the annual reports
and nds that the correlation is higher than 0.99. We implicitly assume that there is consistency
in the denition of managers across rms.22
The data set provides a large variation across rms and industries in the compensation of
managers compared to non-managers, which enables us to better understand how they react to IPR
reform. For instance, the average share of managerial compensation in total labour compensation
19 In terms of composition, approximately 20% of the rms in the dataset are registered under the Chemical and
Pharmaceutical industries, followed by Food Products and Beverages (13.74%), Textiles (10.99%) and Basic Metals
(10.46%).
20 It may well be that there are more layers in a given rm, but the nature and scope of the data does not enable us
to empirically observe these sub-layers, capping the analysis at three hierarchial layers. Caliendo et al. (2015) uses
data for French manufacturing rms to classify each rm by four vertical layers according to occupational tasks. Cruz
et al. (2018), on the other hand, uses data for Brazilian rms to see whether capacity building programs impacts
rm organization. They follow Caliendo et al. (2015) to segregate the rms into ve hierarchial layers. However,
both of these studies classify CEOs and senior managers into two di¤erent hierarchial levels, where we have combined
them into one with executive powers within a rm. In addition, Cruz et al. (2018) divides the non-managers between
clerks and services as well.
21For example, a rm Jaipur Polyspin Ltd., Mr. V. K Singhal has been designated as Manager (Production)and
Mr. S. L. Dhanuka as Chaiperson and Managing Director. In case of Unimin India Ltd. has Mr. M. G. Karkhanis
as Vice-President (Marketing), and Mr. J. B. S. Bakshi as Chairperson and Managing Director. We note that the
names of the managers belonging to the middle management are are more sparsely reported than those in the top
management. However, this is not the case with the compensation data.
22There is scope for some subjective interpretation of this distinction by rms, when providing data. However, all
rms included in the analysis are listed in the Mumbai Stock Exchange, and hence are subject to the same corporate
governance and reporting regulations including the said denitions, which mitigates this concern to a large extent.
Moreover, our results on managers as a single group do not get a¤ected by such issues.
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across 2-digit industries for the period of 1990-2006 goes from a low of approximately 1.5% to a
high of around 9% (Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018). The variation is also observed when measuring
changes (in managerial compensation) over time; averaging annual changes over the same period,
we observe that while in some industries the average annual rate of change is around 10%, in others
it can get as high as 200%. Such variation will be more prominent when the data translates to the
rm level.
4 Empirical Strategy
Higher incentives to innovation induce rms to change their internal structure to maximize inno-
vation potential, and this change is more pronounced for more technologically advanced rms. To
assess such e¤ects, we use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 as an instrument for innovation
to analyze its e¤ect on the share of managerial compensation in total labour compensation for
manufacturing rms in India. We use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach following Branstetter et
al. (2006, 2011) controlling for other rm and industry level characteristics and other simultaneous







where, i indexes an individual rm, j the rms industry group, and t the year. Mcomp
denotes the total managerial compensation, whereas Tcomp is the total labour compensation of a
rm. So, the dependent variable measures the share of managerial compensation in total labour
compensation of a rm. IPR02 is the post-IPR reform dummy variable, which takes a value of 1
for years on and following the imposition of The Patent (Amendments) Act, 2002. In particular,
IPR02 takes 1 for the years 2002-2006.
An intellectual property rights reform raises the incentives to invest both in R&D and technology
transfer. On the other hand, managerial skill is complement to technological inputs. Therefore, the
rms that already have higher level of technology at the time of the reform, would demand more
managers than those which are technologically less advanced. Acemoglu et al. (2006) argues that
for countries which are closer to the technology frontier, selection of high-skilled managers becomes
crucial as managerial skill is important for innovation. To study whether such is the case at the
14
rm-level, i.e., whether a change in patent regime a¤ects rmsdemand for managers di¤erentially,
we divide the rms into two groups based on their investment in technology adoption before the
reform. Firms that over the years before the reform (1990-2001) average greater than the median
technology adoption (sum of R&D expenditure and royalty payment for technical know-how) of the
industry to which it belongs, are dened as high-techrms or treatedgroup in our estimation.
We assign these rms a high technology use dummy, HighTech, equals to 1. For the rest of the
rms, HighTech equals 0, which serves as controlgroup in our estimations.23
Therefore, our key variable of interest is the interaction term IPR02 HighTech (or its coe¢ -
cient 1). It measures the di¤erential response of the high-tech and low-tech rms due to the IPR
shock in terms of demand for managers. In other words, 1 measures between-rm inequality in
terms of demand for managerial workers. On the other hand, IPR02 estimates the direct e¤ect of
the IPR reform on the demand for managers. Alternatively, it measures the within-rm changes in
the share of managerial compensation on total labour compensation.
Xijt is a vector of rm and industry characteristics which are likely to impact a rms managerial
compensation. For example, following Chakraborty and Raveh (2018), we use both input and
output tari¤s at the industry-level to control for trade reforms initiated by the Govt. of India during
the 1990s. We also specically control for product market competition e¤ect (both for domestic
and export market), skill-intensity, management technology, IT expenditure, labour-regulation,
productivity, etc. We also include three rm-level controls (firmcontrols) in all our specications:
age of a rm (older rms may have a more established structure and culture; controlling for age
would take care of the potential di¤erences in the exibility of undertaking organizational reforms),
amount of capital employed as a share of total gross value-added (higher capital intensity may also
raise the demand for managers signicantly) and assets (larger rms may have greater management
needs). We use assets and capital intensity in (t  1) period. i and t are time-invariant rm and
year xed e¤ects, respectively.
While estimating the above equation, we carefully control for other simultaneous reforms, such
as delicensing of industries, tax incentives for R&D, The Competition Act, 2002, corporate gover-
23While it is true that this is not a perfect control group that we could use in the estimations, given the nature of
the reform, it is di¢ cult to nd a group of rms, which is exogenous to the change in intellectual property regime.
Given the circumstances, this is the best we could use as all other sectors are also simultaneously impacted by other
reforms (e.g., trade reforms). Using any other sector, say agriculture, would have been more exogenous to the reform,
but the behavioural pattern of the agricultural sector is completely di¤erent from that of services and may bias the
results in a di¤erent manner.
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nance reforms24, etc. that may a¤ect the share of managerial compensation in a rm. Those, if not
controlled for can bias our outcomes. To control for these unobserved policy changes (or any other
change in the economic environment a¤ecting all rms), we use jt  industry-year trends. We
interact a rms industrial classication at NIC 5-digit level (most disaggregated level of industrial
classication) with year trends to control for other simultaneous policy reforms that may a¤ect our
dependent variable. We also replace the industry-year trends with industry-year xed e¤ects at
various aggregate (industrial classication) levels, but the results do not change.
However, one should still be careful in interpreting the basic estimates as conclusive evidence
of the causal e¤ect of the IPR reform on the di¤erential demand for managers between high-tech
and low-tech rms because of the following two reasons: (a) omitted variable bias; and (b) reverse
causality. We address the former by sequentially adding various rm and industry characteristics
and its interaction with the HighTech dummy to our baseline specication. As for the latter,
we show that the managerial compensation or any other feature that is closely associated with
the demand for managers did not inuence the IPR reform through a series of exogeneity checks
explicitly in the following section.
4.1 Exogeneity of The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002
A crucial issue regarding our identication strategy is to establish that the timing of the 2002 IPR
reform as exogenous, at least with respect to the internal reorganization activities of the Indian
manufacturing rms. It may be that the previous IPR amendment bills or acts, say the one in
1999 led the rms to start demanding for managers anticipating the implementation of a stronger
amendment act in the next few years and this inuenced the di¤erential e¤ect on managerial
compensation between high-tech and low-tech rms. Also, there may be other changes, which are
24There were a couple of crucial changes in the realm of corporate governance reforms that took place around
the implementation of The Patents (Amendment), Act, 2002: (i) exogenous changes in the Clause 49. The Clause
49 reform required rms to change the composition of their board of directors  specically, at least 50% of the
board had to consist of independent directors; and (ii) in 2002 the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
(Amendment) Act, 2002 replaced the earlier SEBI Act, 1992 to enlarge the Board of Directors of rms and transparent
functioning of the Indian capital market. All these changes can induce a large number of rms to consistently report
the compensation of the managers (especially, the top managers). However, we argue that is not the case. First,
looking at Figure 3 closely, it can be noticed that it is not only after 2002 that we observe a sharp rise in the share
in managerial compensation; it was also during mid-1990s. If it had been only for the corporate governance reforms
and nothing else, then we would have seen only a secular trend before 2002 and no spike. Chakraborty and Raveh
(2018) show that the increase in the share of managerial compensation during the 1990s is due to the trade reforms
undertaken by India. Second, even though the reform for the Clause 49 was adopted by SEBI in 2000, it was only in
late 2002, SEBI constituted a committee to assess the adequacy of current corporate governance practices, and based
on the recommendations of this committee, the Clause 49 came into operation on 1 January 2006.
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coincident with The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in terms of a high-tech rms behavior towards
demand for managers. For example, there might be pressure by the big rms or multinationals
to the Govt. of India to impose a stronger intellectual rights regime to create a certain kind
of monopoly power over some products, which can reap them higher benets. While, we cannot
completely rule out these alternative explanations, we can examine their plausibility more carefully.
To understand, whether such are the cases or not, we run some checks in Table 3.
We start by checking whether the 1999 Patent Act has a proactive e¤ect on the share of
managerial compensation. In other words, we examine if the observed e¤ect of 2002 reform sustains,
when we introduce the 1999 reform. Column (1) interacts the 1999 reform dummy, IPR99, with our
HighTech dummy. We dene IPR99 as a time dummy, which takes a value 1 if the year is greater
than or equal to 1999. Our variable of interest, IPR02  HighTech, is positive and signicant
with no e¤ect of the IPR99 HighTech. In column (2), we replace our HighTech dummy in the
interaction term IPR99 HighTech with HighTech98. HighTech98 takes a value 1 if the average
technological adoption expenditure of a rm for the years 1990 to 1998 is greater than the median
technological expenditure of the industry to which the rm belongs. We do this to understand
whether a rm, which was a high-tech before the 1999 Act, raised its demand for managers because
of the 1999 reform and the 2002 reform was nothing but an additional push. We fail to nd any
evidence of such kind. In column (3), we additionally interact HighTech98 with IPR02 in order to
see if the high-tech rms were re-organizing their rm structure in anticipation to the 2002 reform.
We nd our coe¢ cient of interest (IPR02  HighTech) to be positive and signicant, with the
additional interaction term not a¤ecting our outcome of interest. In short, our results tell us that
the 2002 IPR reform is not a mere extension of the 1999 reform , but an unanticipated change
towards a stronger intellectual property rights regime.
Additionally, we run a placebo test with detailed estimates of the timing of changes in share
of managerial compensation. In particular, we use an ex-ante ex-post approach to prove that The
Patents (Amendment), Act 2002 is not endogenous. In other words, the estimation examines if
there were any anticipatory e¤ects of the reform. It could be possible that some of the high-
tech rms were lobbying for the implementation of a stronger IPR regime to reap higher benets
and started reorganizing the rm structure accordingly. This could have increased the share of
managerial compensation of the rms before the reform and post-2002 increase was just a mere
continuation. We argue that this is not the case. We follow Branstetter et al. (2006) and adopt the
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following methodology. The IPR02(t 4) dummy is equal to one for all years that predate the 2002
patent act by four or more years and is equal to zero in other years, and the IPR02(t+4) dummy is
equal to one for all years at least four years after the IPR reform and zero during other years. The
other reform dummies are equal to one in specic years and zero during other years. There is no
dummy for the year immediately preceding the ban (i.e., year t  1); the coe¢ cient on the reform
dummy estimates relative to that year. The results indicate that the coe¢ cients on the dummies
for years prior to The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 fails to show any evidence of a signicant
movement in the demand for managers prior to the reform when estimated relative to the preceding
year. For example, the coe¢ cient on the IPR02(t  4) show that the managerial compensation of
a high-tech rm is negative and insignicant prior to the reform relative to the concurrent e¤ect
of the reform, which is IPR02 HighTech. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term of IPR02 and
HighTech continues to be positive and signicant; whereas, the coe¢ cient for the years after the
reform are large, positive and signicant. Thus, the timing of changes is consistent with a shift
in activities that follows the enactment of the reform; the coe¢ cients are positive, signicant and
increases over time.
We ran some further checks following Khandelwal and Topalova (2011) to test for potential
lobbying e¤ect and inuence of the 1999 reform. In particular, we test whether the interaction of
high-tech dummy and reform dummy is correlated with important pre-reform (pre-2002 but post-
1999) industry characteristics, which may have inuenced the 2002 reform. These characteristics
include share of managerial compensation (a larger share of managers may inuence the industry
lobbyists to put pressure on the Govt. to adopt more stronger intellectual property rights), share of
skilled workers (a highly skilled work force may also push for reforms in order to reap benets from
higher incentives to innovation) and average factory size (this captures the ability of producers to
organize political pressure groups to lobby for stronger patent rights regime). All the pre-reform
characteristics are measured at the year 2000-01. These results are presented in columns (5) (7)
in Table 3. The coe¢ cients indicate no statistical correlation between the complementary e¤ect
of technology adoption and 2002 IPR dummy and any of the industry characteristics.
One possible explanation for these outcomes can be traced to Reddy and Chandrashekaran
(2017). They conduct a careful study of the dilemmas involved in the implementation of the
reforms towards stronger protection of patent rights, showing that there was a lot of uncertainty
involved during the debates and discussions in the parliament with regard to the implementation of
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a TRIPs-compliant patent regime. Finally, we investigate whether the policymakers implemented
the 2002 Act in response to rmsdemand for managers. If this were the case, one should expect
current share of managerial compensation to predict future implementation of the IPR reform due
to the inuence of the high-tech rms. We regress IPR02  HighTech on share of managerial
compensation in (t   2) period, controlling for rm and industry-year xed e¤ects. Column (8)
presents the result from such an exercise. The correlation between future reform and current
managerial compensation is indistinguishable from 0.
5 Results
In this section, we report our empirical ndings on the e¤ect of the IP reform of 2002 on the
organization of Indian rms. We describe our results under three heads: managerial compensation,
incentive provision and organizational design.
5.1 Managerial Compensation
We present our benchmark results from estimating equation (1) for the period 1990-2006 in Table
4. We provide di¤erent specications by varying the xed e¤ects (rm, year, industry-year and so
on) as well as the level of aggregation while always controlling for the age (including a quadratic
term), ownership and size of a rm. These regressions estimate the e¤ect of the IPR reform on
the demand for managers in the intensive margin, i.e., as measured in terms of share of total
compensation.
We nd that in each of these specications, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term IPR02
HighTech is positive, highly signicant and roughly similar across specications (1.6% 1.7%).
On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of the variable IPR02 is positive and signicant for the initial
specications, but becomes insignicant once we allow for industry xed e¤ects at su¢ ciently
disaggregated levels. In other words, the increase in the demand for managers in the intensive
margin is due to both within-rm e¤ect as well the di¤erences in the high-tech and low-tech rms,
but the latter e¤ect is stronger.
In column (6), we additionally interact the HighTech dummy with year dummies to control









The coe¢ cient of the interaction term is still positive and signicant. But, in this case it is
smaller than the coe¢ cient of IPR02. This points out that when controlling for pre-trends, the
within-rm wage inequality is higher than the between-rm, which is opposite to that of our nding
in column (4). Figure 5 plots coe¢ cients from equation (2) for our main rm outcome variable,
share of managerial compensation. The estimated coe¢ cients illustrate that, the di¤erence between
the high-tech and low-tech rms in terms of share of managerial compensation is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero before the patent reform of 2002. However, share of managerial compensation
rises di¤erentially for high-tech rms after 2002.
In column (7), we use simple Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE), which measures the di¤erence in
mean (average) outcomes between the units assigned to the treatment (high-tech rms) and control
(low-tech rms) group, respectively. Our estimates suggest that the 2002 IPR reform increases the
relative demand for managers gap between high-tech and low-tech rms by 1.6-1.7% at the mean,
which is the same as the estimate from our OLS regressions. Lastly, in columns (8) and (9), we
divide the managerial compensation between middle and top managers to see the variation in e¤ect
across managerial layers. Share of compensation across rms increases for both the management
levels, albeit higher for the top than the middle. However, on the other hand, there is no within-rm
e¤ect in case of top managers; the entire e¤ect is concentrated for middle managers.25
Managerial share of total compensation is a measure of demand for managerial skill in the
intensive margin. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 performs the same analysis for demand for
managers in the extensive margin by treating the total number of managers26 as the outcome
variable. We see that while the IPR reform has had no within-rm e¤ect on the extensive margin
25We also use absolute level of total managerial compensation, disaggregated into top and middle level, as the
dependent variable. We report the results in Table 13 of Appendix B. Our coe¢ cient of interest continues to be
positive and signicant.
26PROWESS provides names of the managers at the top and middle management level. We count the names
to calculate the number of managers in a rm across di¤erent years. We note that the names of the managers
belonging to the middle management are not as consistently reported as top management. So, when we match the
data (with the number of managers across both management levels and compensation), the number of observations
drop signicantly. However, that is not the case with only the top management. If we use only the top management
data, then the number of observations rise signicantly and our result continues to hold.
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but the between-rm e¤ect is positive and signicant, i.e., the reform caused the high tech rms to
employ 6.3% - 6.9% more managers than the low tech rms at the mean. While the extensive margin
considers the e¤ect of IPR on quantityof managers employed, columns (3) through (6) looks at
the average price of managers. We now treat as dependent variable the average compensation
of managers obtained by dividing the total compensation with the number of managers in a rm.
Columns (3) and (4) tell us that both the within- and between-rm e¤ect are positive and signicant
when we look at managers as a whole. Columns (5) and (6) looks at the average compensation
for middle managers and top managers respectively. While we obtain the same pattern as the
overall, there is an interesting di¤erence across levels: the between-rm e¤ect is stronger (both in
signicance and magnitude) for top managers and the within-rm e¤ect is similarly stronger for
middle managers.
In Table 14 in the Appendix B, we perform a set of similar exercises for non-managerial
employees.27 We nd that, in terms of non-managerial share of total compensation, the within-rm
e¤ect is positive while the between-rm e¤ect is negative. Moreover, while there is no signicant
e¤ect of IPR on average compensation, there is a positive e¤ect on employment both through the
within-rm and between-rm channels.
Combining all the results, it points out to the fact that the 2002 IPR reform did increase a
managers internal worth to the organization and its average value in the market more for the
high-tech rms than the low-tech. On the other hand, while the same reform led to an increase
in non-managerial employment, their share of compensation went down since their average wages
remained virtually unchanged across the economy. In a somewhat similar context, Vashisht (2017)
nds that adoption of new technology has increased the demand for high-skilled workers at the cost
of intermediary skills, leading to the polarization of manufacturing jobs in India. These results may
suggest that technology has reduced the routine task content of manufacturing jobs in India.28
5.2 Disaggregating Compensation into Wages and Incentives
Our analysis so far indicates that the 2002 IPR reform has a signicant positive impact on the
relative demand for managers in the high-tech rms more than that of low-tech rms. Now, we
27We note that PROWESS provides very limited data (only for about 250 rms) on the total number of employees.
We do not claim that using data for such a small number of rms can be generalized, but it gives an idea of what
happened on the non-managerial side of the rms.
28Garicano (2000) argues that managerial skill is important for non-routine tasks in the production processes.
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examine how this IPR reform inuenced the form of managerial compensation across rms.
There is considerable debate in the literature about the role of performance incentives in mo-
tivating innovation. Holmstrom (1989), Teece (1994) and Amabile (1996) indicate that short-term
performance incentives may not be conducive to generating e¤ort towards innovative activities.
Lerner and Wulf (2007) and Kline et al. (2017) point out the value of long term incentives for
innovation. We, however, nd an increase in incentive share of pay especially for high tech rms.
We disaggregate the compensation into wages and incentives by di¤erent management layers
and present the results in Table 6. We dene as incentive pay, a part of compensation reported,
as the following heads: (a) benets or perquisites; (b) bonuses and commission; (c) contribution
to provident fund; and (d) contribution to pension, whereas wages are considered to be the pre-
determined component of the total compensation salary received by the employees. Columns (1) and
(4) examine managersshare of total wage compensation, Mwages=Twages, and managersshare
of total incentive pay, Mincentives=T incentives, similar to our outcome of interest in Equation
(1).
Notice rst that the coe¢ cient of the interaction term in column (1) is negative and weakly
signicant, and the same in column (4) is positive and highly signicant. Therefore, di¤erences
between high-tech and low-tech rms in terms of demand for managers is only due to the di¤erence
in share of incentives. On the other hand, the within-rm e¤ect is positive for managersshare of
wages but insignicant for managersshare of incentives. This result is consistent with empirical
ndings elsewhere that a positive external shock (e.g., trade liberalization) brings about an increase
in managerial compensation through an increase in incentive pay (Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009;
Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018). Our result that incentive driven increase is concentrated in high-
tech rms is also reminiscent of the conclusion in Acemoglu et al. (2006) that rms closer to the
technological frontier provide sharper incentives to their managers.
Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) provide the e¤ect of IPR on wage and incentive compensation of
top and middle management separately. As mentioned before, we consider managers with executive
powers as part of the top management and those without executive powers (typically, divisional
managers) as belonging to the middle management. We nd that IPR positively impacted the
incentive pay of the middle management (both within- and between-rms) but the e¤ect of IPR
on incentive share of the top management is only visible across rms. For wage share, the negative
overall between-rm e¤ect comes entirely from the top management while the within-rm e¤ect is
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positive for both layers.29 Therefore, the increase in managerial compensation for high-tech rms
relative to low-tech rms should be attributed mostly to the increase in the share of incentive pay
for executives in the middle management. Our result, then, contradicts the suggestion in Olney
and Keller (2017) that external shock can lead to increased pay inequality due to top management
executives paying large bonuses to themselves.
5.3 Organizational Architecture
Teece (1994) points out that adoption of new technologies by a rm leads to implementation of new
organizational forms. In a similar context, Little (1985, p.14) highlights that Our work among
innovative companies indicates that the management decision on how to organize for innovation is
critical. We have already noted that the impact of IPR on the relative demand for managers in
high-tech rms was di¤erent from that on low-tech rms. We now look into how the e¤ect of IPR
on internal organization varies across these two categories of rms. We study the organizational
change both in terms of horizontal and vertical expansion, and present the results in Table 7.
A horizontal expansion refers to the addition of new divisions with similar managerial and
non-managerial layering. While PROWESS does not provide details of the number of divisions in
a rm, we proxy horizontal expansion by the number of product varieties (following a suggestion
in Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010). Columns (1) and (2) indicate that IPR reforms force a high-tech
rm to introduce signicantly more product varieties than a low-tech rm (and possibly open more
divisions).
In the spirit of Garicano (2000) and the related literature (Caliendo et al., 2015; Cruz et al.,
2018), we think of vertical expansion as addition of hierarchical layers between the CEO and the non-
managerial workers. Our data allows us to identify three layers: top management (i.e., managers
with executive powers like the CEO, CFO, etc.),30 middle management (e.g., divisional managers)
and the non-managerial employees. We introduce a variable that counts the number of vertical
layers in a rm (i.e., taking values 1, 2 or 3). We assume that each rm must have one management
layer, possibly the top management. We can identify whether there is a middle management based
29We have also checked the results for wages and incentives for each group (all managers, top management and
middle management) as a share of total compensation. The results do not change. Table 15 reports our additional
ndings.
30However, our data can also allow us to follow the classication of Caliendo et al. (2015), where they categorized
only the CEOs as the top management layer and other managers with executive powers as the layer below the top
management. But, we have decided to combine these two layers into 1.
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on the compensation and designations of the managers provided. However, PROWESS does not
provide names of non-managers. So, we consider a rm to have a non-managerial layer if the total
compensation of non-managers is reported to be positive.31
Columns (3) and (4) considers the e¤ect of the 2002 IPR reform on the vertical dimension of
a rm. Our coe¢ cient of interest points out that the 2002 IPR reform signicantly increased the
di¤erences in hierarchical structure between high-tech and low-tech rms. Similar vertical expansion
due to external shocks have been studied in other contexts in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012),
Caliendo et al. (2017) and Cruz et al. (2018).
These results demonstrate that the 2002 IPR reform induced both vertical and horizontal ex-
pansion for high-tech rms relative to their low-tech counterparts. Next, we check which dimension
of expansion is the main driver behind the increased relative demand for managers. We interact
both the number of vertical layers as well as product scope with our original interaction term
IPR02 HighTech, in the regression for relative demand for managers.32 Our conditional corre-
lates in column (5) and (6) point out that the increase in the demand for managers are due to the
adding of new products by a rm rather than adding a vertical layer. In other words, the higher rel-
ative compensation for managers can be attributed to the fact that high tech rms respond to IPR
by increasing product innovation which leads to new divisions being opened, leading to subsequent
demand for managers. This result stands both in support and contrast to the literature looking
at rm reorganization and knowledge optimization as a result to market forces.33 Guadalupe and
Wulf (2010) and Chen (2017) shows that import competition can lead a rm to expand horizontally,
whereas Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), Caliendo et al. (2015; 2017), Spanos (2017), Cruz et
al. (2018) seems to focus more on vertical adjustment as a result to external shocks such as trade,
productivity, etc.
5.4 Firm Characteristics
We now examine additional heterogeneity in Table 8 using various rm characteristics to identify
the set of rms, which drive the main result(s). We start by dividing the sample into exporters and
31We only consider the rms for which the non-managerial compensation is reported to be non-zero. Admittedly,
our denition of layers is very coarse and what we capture is e¤ectively the probability with which rms add a middle
management due to the IPR shock.
32Our regressions include all the respective double interaction terms.
33Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) using data on French and British establishments show that technological adoption
leads to decentralization of authority or increases a managers span of control.
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non-exporters in columns (1) and (2). The coe¢ cients show that the di¤erential response in the
demand for managers is signicant for both exporters and non-exporters, with the e¤ect signicantly
higher for the latter group of rms. Interestingly, on the other hand, the within-rm e¤ect is higher
for exporters. We believe that this result is due to the fact that to begin with, exporting rms as
a group are much more similar in terms of technological expenditure than non-exporting rms.
Next, we divide rms by ownership domestic and foreign in columns (3) and (4). The interac-
tion e¤ect of IPR02 HighTech is signicant for both domestic and foreign rms, with the e¤ect
slightly higher for foreign rms. In terms of within-rm e¤ect, we nd a similar e¤ect (in terms of
magnitude) for domestic rms and no e¤ect for foreign rms. Lastly, in columns (5) and (6) we
follow Nouroz (2001) and use the input-output classications to categorize rms by the end use
of their products. The division is made into two groups intermediate (intermediates, basic and
capital) and nal (consumer durables and non-durables) goods. The interaction e¤ect is signicant
for both classes of rms. Overall, our ndings show that an IPR shock has an economy-wide e¤ect
in comparison to trade or other marcoeconomic shocks, where the e¤ect is limited to only a few
sections of rms such as exporters (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012).
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We check for the robustness of our results by using several controls, alternative techniques, sample
and time period in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.
5.5.1 Additional Controls
This section controls for all other possible channels that can simultaneously a¤ect the managerial
compensation of a rm. While some of these channels do have signicant e¤ects, our primary result
remains true and signicant in every case establishing the fact that IPR reforms indeed contribute
to a higher relative demand for managers for high-tech rms.
Trade Shocks: We start by controlling for all possible trade channels that can concurrently
a¤ect managerial compensation and present the results in Table 9. Recent research by Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) points out that trade signicantly a¤ects organizational structure of
rms through increase in demand for managers (Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; Chakraborty and
Raveh, 2018). Chakraborty and Raveh (2018) uses the trade liberalization exercise adopted by
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India during the 1990s to examine its e¤ect on the demand for managers and show that drop in
input and not output tari¤s signicantly explains the rise in the share of managerial compensation
for Indian manufacturing rms. We use the same indicators and interact them with HighTech
in columns (1), (2) and (3). Our results indicate that both input and output tari¤s signicantly
increased the di¤erence in the demand for managers across high-tech and low-tech rms. However,
we do not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect when we use them jointly.
Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show that import competition
and product market competition signicantly a¤ects managerial or executive compensation. We
use Chinese competition as a proxy for import competition.34 We use two di¤erent indicators for
Chinese import competition in columns (4) and (5) to measure such e¤ect. PROWESS does not
give any information regarding the trade destinations of the rms. To overcome such a shortcoming,
we match the rm-level data from PROWESS with the trade-destination based product level UN-
COMTRADE dataset at NIC 2004 4-digit level. To establish causality between import competition
and managerial compensation, we follow Chakraborty and Henry (2017) and use Chinas entry to
the WTO on December 11th, 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment, together with the di¤erential
competitive pressures faced by Indian rms due to this trade shock, as our identication strategy.





= Avg [ imports from China for the years 1992 2001 for the industrial category jimports from World for the years 1992 2001 for the industrial category j ]
Thus, we dene AvgM01Chinaj as a measure of Chinese competition that an industry faces
because of the unilateral liberalization policies pursued by China; it is a 10-year average of the share
of imports by industry j for the period 1992-2001. We interact this measure with WTOt. WTOt
is a year dummy variable intended to capture the e¤ect of Chinas entry into the WTO. It takes a
value of 1 for the years following the signing of the WTO agreement by China. Therefore, WTOt
equals 1 for the years 2002-2006. So, our variable of interest, AvgM01Chinaj WTOt, provides a
measure of the amount of competition faced by Indian rms as a result of China becoming a member
of the WTO. The interaction term AvgM01Chinaj WTOt provides a clear and exogenous measure
34 Indias imports from China increased from around 1% in 1992 to 17% in 2006; the increase in the share is
especially sharp between 2001 and 2006, from 5.5% to 17%.
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of import competition from China and represents a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to measure
the e¤ect of Chinese import competition on the product variety of Indian manufacturing rms.
In order to measure the di¤erential e¤ect of the Chinese import competition on the managerial
compensation, we interact AvgM01Chinaj WTOt with our HighTech dummy. We fail to nd any
statistically signicant e¤ect of domestic competition from Chinese imports.35
Next, in column (5), we use an alternate measure of Chinese import competition. We use lagged
value of the share of imports from China at NIC 2004 4-digit level weighted by sales share of those
industries. We continue to nd no e¤ect of Chinese import competition.
Caliendo et al. (2017) argue that participation in export market signicantly increases executive
compensation. In column (6), we use the share of Indias exports in total imports of the US to
see whether export market competition has positively a¤ected the demand for managers. We nd
negative e¤ect of the interaction term with weak signicance. Higher participation in the export
market closes the gap between high-tech and low-tech rms in terms of demand for managers.
Other Possible Channels: We follow Chakraborty and Raveh (2018) and test for other industry-
and rm-level channels in Table 10. We start by testing the potential correlation between relative
demand for managers and skilled labour. We measure the latter using the 3-digit industry level ratio
of non-production workers to all employees in an industry, obtained from Ghosh (2014) (1990-2000),
and the ASI (2001-2006). The main result continues to hold, suggesting that it is not driven only
by increases in the demand for skill. However, our outcome variable of interest and skill intensity
appears to be signicantly correlated. This suggests that capital-skill complementarity might also
be a channel through which demand for managers increased because of higher technology adoption
due to the IPR reform.
Column (2) uses management technology and its interaction with HighTech dummy as an
additional control. We use data on management technology from World Management Survey. It
is given for a single year, which is 2004 across all the NIC 2004 2-digit industries. Our estimates
point out that management technology of an industry is positively and signicantly correlated with
the demand for managers, but this is a complementary additional e¤ect with our main variable of
35We also check our results by looking at Chinese competition in one of Indias important export market, the U.S.
We use the Chinese share of imports by the U.S. to check whether competition from China in Indias one of the most
important trade destinations lead to such changes in the share of managerial compensation of rms. We do not nd
any such evidence.
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interest still positive and signicant. Establishment of new factories may create a demand for new
managers, as local knowledge is important (Bloom et al., 2010). Therefore, we use an additional
related measure: the number of factories and plants at the industry-level, derived from ASI. The
inclusion of this additional control does little to change our benchmark nding.
Bloom et al. (2013) points out that better managed rms in India have higher productivity. To
address this, we control for productivity using Levinshon and Petrin (2003) methodology in column
(4). As the results demonstrate, more productive rms demand more managers, but our coe¢ cient
of primary interest is stable is sign, magnitude and signicance.
One can argue that the sudden expansion in Information Technology enabled services (ITES)
in early 2000s can explain some of the increased relative demand for managers in the high-tech
rms that we ascribe to IP reforms. In order to control for this, we use expenditure incurred by
rms towards in-house information technology and consultancy fees for technological upgradation
in column (5). We nd consultancy fees for technology upgradation to be signicantly correlated
with the share of managerial compensation. However, the sign and signicance of our main channel
does not go away.
As highlighted by Bloom et al. (2013), family rms may use their control over the Board of
Directors to appoint their family members in several of the managerial positions within the rm and
this could increase the managerial compensation. We construct an indicator for family ownership
by considering the proportion of shares held by Hindu undivided families from 2007 (which is the
rst year for which PROWESS reports such data) and assuming that such proportion remained
constant over the period 1990-2006. In column (6), we interact the family-ownership indicator with
IPR02HighTech and see whether family rms inuence any increase in the share of managerial
compensation or not. We do not get any such evidence.
Olney and Keller (2017) suggest that the increase in managerial compensation during a trade
shock may be explained by the fact that the top management gets to decide its own pay. In order to
check if our results can be explained by the lack of good corporate governance, we use the number
of independent directors in the Board of a rm as an indicator of quality of governance. Since most
rms started reporting the composition of their boards from 2003-2004 onwards, matching the
number of independent directors with our main dataset running from 1990 till 2006 drops around
90 percent of the observations. In column (7) we report the results from this control. None of the
regressors are signicant, including our main variable of interest; but the sign of the coe¢ cient does
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not change.
Lastly, following Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), we control for cross-regional variation in labour
market rigidity in India in order to check if the sharper response of high-tech rms to IP reforms
appears due to a possible concentration of high-tech rms with more exible labour market regu-
lations. Accordingly, we use the postcode for each rm to locate its state/region and then interact
the state-year xed e¤ects to control for the variation in labour regulations across di¤erent states
in India in column (8). Our baseline result does not change.36
5.5.2 Trend-Break Analysis
Following Burgess and Pande (2005), we estimate a trend break model to control for the di¤erential






= i + t + jt + 1[HighTechi  (t  2001)] + 2[HighTechi  (2002  2006)]
+3[IPR02  (t  2001)] + 4[IPR02  (2002  2006)] + firmcontrols+ it
(3)
Here, (t   2001) is a linear time trend and captures the di¤erential pre-trend and post-trends
of the 2002 patent reform, whereas (2002  2006) is xed time trend of the 2002 patent Act. These
terms enter the regression interacted with our HighTech and IPR02 dummy. The time trends
have a switch in 2002 because of the implementation of the Patent Amendment Act (2002). If
the patent reform of 2002 has signicantly inuenced the demand for managers, we expect the
interaction terms of the [2002  2006] trend with HighTech and IPR02 dummy to be signicantly
di¤erent from the pre-trend interactions. Results are reported in Table 11. We test for this using
share of managerial compensation (columns (1) (2)), total number of managers (column (3)), and
average managerial compensation (column (4)) as the dependent variables, respectively.
Our coe¢ cients show that the post-trends are signicantly di¤erent from pre-trends. For exam-
36Besley and Burgess (2004) divides all the major Indian states based on the amendments done by each state on
the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) into three categories: pro-worker, neutral or pro-employer. We interact the index
from Besley and Burgess with our variable of interest, IPR02  HighTech, and ran our regression. The estimate
does not change. A recent OECD study on state-level labour reforms in India uses a survey to identify the areas in
which states have made specic changes to the implementation and administration of labour laws. The regulations
covered by the state specic survey goes well beyond the IDA and include the Factories Act, the Trade Union Act,
and Contract Labour Act among others. We also use the OECD (2007) indicator to replace the Besley and Burgess
(2004); our baseline result still does not alter.
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ple, the e¤ect of 2002 IPR reform on the share of managerial compensation for the high-tech rms,
HighTech (2002  2006), is ve times higher than pre-trend. In case of number of managers or
the extensive margin, we do not see any e¤ect of pre-trends. Lastly, in case of average managerial
compensation, the result continues to be the same the post-trends are signicantly di¤erent from
pre-trends.
5.5.3 Other Robustness Checks
InTable 12, we start by changing the time period under consideration from 1990-2006 to 1990-2005.
The reason for doing so is that 2005 is a crucial year when India nally complied with the TRIPs
agreement and this could inuence the outcome of interest. Reducing the time period does not
a¤ect our benchmark nding the complementarity e¤ect of IPR reform of 2002 and technology
adoption continues to signicantly explain the di¤erence in the demand for managers between
high-tech and low-tech rms. Column (2) aggregates our dependent variable (Mcomp=Tcomp) and
HighTech to the industry-level (formally, HighTechi is replaced by HighTechj ; where j denotes
an industry). An industry is categorized as HighTech if its average technological expenditure for
the period 1990-2001 is greater than the median technological or innovation expenditure of the
whole of manufacturing sector. The motivation to do this is to check whether the di¤erential e¤ect
holds between these di¤erent types of industries as well. The results suggest that the 2002 IPR
reform also led to larger increase in demand for managers in high-tech industries. In other words,
our benchmark result is robust to this kind of aggregation.
Column (3) runs a placebo test. We drop all rms except for those in the pharmaceutical sector
from the sample. The reason to do this are twofold: (i) the pharmaceutical rms are known to be
the early adopters of technology as compared to other manufacturing sectors; and (ii) unlike other
sectors, product patents were already allowed for the pharmaceutical sector prior to 2002. Given
these primitives, we should not expect any e¤ect of the reform of 2002 on the pharmaceutical rms.
The estimate shows our hypothesis to be true.
Big rms pay disproportionately larger compensation to their managers and this can also in-
uence the overall results (Autor et al., 2017). To correct for such bias, we drop rms, which are
greater than 90th percentile of the total assets of the industry to which the rm belongs in column
(4). The baseline coe¢ cient does not change.
Since our dependent variable is a ratio, estimating zero-valued variables with OLS may produce
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biased estimates. So, we use fractional logit and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
(Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) in columns (5) and (6) to control for such. Both the methods estimate
the coe¢ cients in terms of percentage changes and the dependent variable does not need to fol-
low a Poisson distribution or be integer-valued (it can be continuous).37 As the point estimates
demonstrate, the 2002 IPR reform continues to induce signicant increase in the relative share of
managerial compensation.
6 Discussion of Results
We nd that the change in intellectual property rights regime in India, as encapsulated in the
Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, had the following e¤ects. The IP reform led to an increase in
managerscompensation as a share of total labor compensation as well as the employment share
of managers. This increase in the relative value of managers is signicantly more for rms that
were technologically advanced before the reform. Additionally, there is also a within-rm shift
in the demand for managers, but the between-rm e¤ect is more consistently signicant across
specications. This increase in relative demand is driven by the demand both for top and middle
managers. Disaggregating the total managerial compensation into wages and incentives, we see
that it is the share of incentives rather than wages that explains the di¤erence between high- tech
and low-tech rms. The rise in incentives is stronger for the middle management than for the top
management. Looking at organizational design, we nd that IPR induces rms to expand in terms of
hierarchical layers as well as horizontal span of control, more so for high-tech rms. Importantly, it is
the horizontal rather than vertical expansion that explains the increase in managerial compensation
in high-tech rms. Lastly, these e¤ects hold across exporters and non-exporters, domestic and
foreign rms as well as rms producing nal or intermediate goods. We now try to reconcile these
ndings with the related literature and seek to nd the channels through which an IPR reform may
raise the demand for managers.
Acemoglu and coauthors, in a series of papers (Acemoglu et al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2007)
hold that managerial skill is more valuable to rms closer to the technological frontier, and in
particular for rms engaged more in innovation than imitation. The IPR reform in India increased
the relative value of product innovation over process imitation by introducing monopoly rights over
37We estimate the standard errors using Eicker-White robust covariance matrix estimator.
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new products. As a result, there was an economywide increase in demand for managers. In addition,
since technology intensity is complementary to managerial skills at the intensive margin, we nd
that the increase in relative demand for managers is stronger for more technologically advanced
rms.
While we measure technological intensity by R&D expenditure and technology transfers, there
is a clutch of other complementary factors associated with technological advancement (e.g., ICT,
management technology, expenditure in physical capital etc.). There is a large literature examining
the correlation between these factors with innovation expenditure, organization design and demand
for skilled labour (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hytt, 1998; Burstein et al., 2016; Caroli
and Van Reenen, 2001; Guadalupe et al., 2014). We nd that each of these has an independent
e¤ect on the increase in relative demand for managers, which is thus consistent with the large
literature on capital-skill complementarity. However, even after controlling for these factors, we
nd that technology intensity of inputs has a statistically signicant e¤ect on share of managerial
compensation for high-tech rms.
Our results are consistent with the idea of a rm as a problem solving entity enunciated in
Garicano (2000). The production process essentially involves workers solving a ow of problems.
Unsolved problems travel up the organizational layers, and a managers role is to attend to the
exceptional problems occurring within his/her span of control. The organizational hierarchy is
designed to optimize managerstime and maximize problem solving e¢ ciency.
The IPR reform increases the value of new products, and as the rm undertakes more new
product development the complexity of the problems faced by the rm increases signicantly. Since
the production workers (non-managers) are faced with more challenging or exceptional problems,
the role of the manager becomes more valuable to the rm. This explains the increase in the demand
for managers relative to production workers consequent to the IPR reform. In addition, we should
also expect the IPR shock to increase the number of managerial layers in order to better handle the
increased volume of exceptional problems. In related work, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
demonstrate evidence of vertical expansion due to a trade shock and explain it using the Garicano
framework. Spanos (2017) also uses this framework to explain increase in hierarchical layers due
to demand expansion.
Our results, especially the between-rm increase in demand for managers is consistent with
the idea of IPR reforms inducing patent-races (Branstetter et al., 2006). While product patents
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increased the gains from product innovation, the rms that were already technologically advanced
had a deeper stock of technical knowledge, skills and resources and therefore were at an advantage
in such races. Therefore, the expected gains from new product development increased more for
rms already ahead in the race.
Our data shows a sharp rise in performance pay especially for high-tech rms while the larger
literature provides at best mixed support for short term incentives as a way of motivating innovation
(Teece, 1994; Amabile, 1996; Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Kline at al., 2017). On the other hand, similar
increase in incentives have been reported due to trade shocks or increased market competition
(Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; Keller and Olney, 2017). We hypothesize that the new IPR regime
suddenly created a climate of competition among rms in the race to capture monopoly rights.
In this environment, the increase in performance pay was possibly a measure adopted by rms in
order to motivate managers to not only engage in innovation but to innovate fast enough to be able
to win the patent race.
Our results about organizational structure validate this idea of managers being incentivized
for patent races. There was a sharp increase in the number of new products introduced by high-
tech rms, and we believe that there was an associated increase in the number of divisions. The
shift in compensation structure towards incentives was sharper for middle managers who were
typically the divisional heads. In fact, the benchmark result of increase in relative demand for
managers in high-tech rms is strongly correlated with this horizontal expansion rather than the
vertical expansion. Notice that it is these middle level managers, i.e., heads of product divisions
and managers of functions like R&D, production, marketing, strategy etc. that drive the entire
process of conceptualizing and bringing a new product to the market. We believe that the main
e¤ect of IPR on rm structure was a sharp increase in the employment and compensation of middle
managers in high-tech rms, and sharper provision of incentive to these managers in order to reduce
the time to market for new products.
It is important to recall here that such incentives indeed translate to higher patent output. As
Figure 6 shows, while the pattern of average patent claims were similar in both high-tech and
low-tech rms before 2002, there is a sharp increase in such claims only for high-tech rms after
2002. Our ndings inform us on the debate on whether management practices can be improved
through incentives or information (Bloom et al., 2017). In this debate, one side thinks of manage-
ment practices as the optimal design for the particular environment while the other side considers
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quality of management as any other technological input which can be increased through appropri-
ate measures. While we do not observe changes in management practices, we nd that sharper
incentives indeed improve R&D output. In this sense, our results provide support for the idea of
managerial input as any other factor of production.
We close this section with a comment comparing the IPR shock with a trade shock. Some
of our results like increased demand for managers, higher between-rm wage inequality, sharper
incentives, etc. have also been observed elsewhere due to increased competitiveness because of trade
shocks. However, while a trade shock typically a¤ects those industries that are engaged in export
or import, we nd that a change in property rights over innovation a¤ects virtually all sectors of the
economy. It is this pervasiveness of impact that underlines the importance of intellectual property
as a lever of policy and driver of welfare.
7 Conclusion
We investigate the e¤ect of an IPR reform on rm structure and whether this e¤ect will be dif-
ferent for high-tech vis-à-vis low-tech rms. We argue that stronger patent rights due to an IPR
reform will induce a high-tech rm to innovate more, creating higher demand for managers. This
is driven by the complementarity between managerial skill, technology adoption and innovation.
Our benchmark estimations indicate that the 2002 IPR reform led to an increase in the share of
managerial compensation of an average high-tech rm as compared to low-tech rm by 1.6.-1.7%.
This e¤ect is robust to various controls, specications, estimation techniques and time periods.
Our results provide suggestive evidence for a quality upgrading mechanism through capital-skill
complementarity.
Our results are also indicative of the kind of changes a developing economy like India goes
through with increasing formalization and integration with the global economy. Associated with
the upgradation of quality in the technologically advanced rms, we nd evidence of increasing
wage inequality in two dimensions: between managers and non-managers as well as between high-
tech and low-tech rms. Such wage polarization appears to be an important economic trade-o¤
associated with globalization of developing economies.
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Figure 1: Technology Adoption Expenditure: Indian Manufacturing Firms, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average technology adoption (sum of R&D expenditure and Technology
Transfer) for manufacturing rms in India, 1990-2006
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Figure 2: Technology Adoption: High-Tech and Low-Tech Firms, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average technology adoption (sum of R&D expenditure and Technology
Transfer) for manufacturing rms in India, 1990-2006
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Figure 3: Managerial Compensation: Indian Manufacturing Firms, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average share of managerial expenditure in total labour compensation for
manufacturing rms in India, 1990-2006
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Figure 4: Managerial Compensation: High-Tech and Low-Tech Firms, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average share of managerial expenditure in total labour compensation for
manufacturing rms in India, 1990-2006
44
Figure 5: Impact of 2002 IPR reform: Managerial Compensation, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the response of the di¤erence in the share of managerial compensation in total
labour compensation for high-tech and low-tech rms in our sample for the period 1990-2006. 95%
condence intervals are shown.
45
Figure 6: Patent Claims: High-Tech and Low-Tech Firms, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average patent claims led with the Indian Patent O¢ ce for manufacturing









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Organizational Variables - Dependent Variables
Managerial Comp/Total Comp 0:02 0:003 0:08 0 1
Managerial Compensation 1:31 0:2 169:65 0 66315:1
Number of Managers 1:82 2 0:85 1 9
Non-Managerial Compensation 95:53 14:4 631:83 0 47619:5
Managerial Wages 0:63 0:04 147:11 0 57590:5
Non-Managerial Wages 93:73 13:6 624:18 0 39720:6
Managerial Bonuses 0:12 0 3:55 0 8724:6
Non-Managerial Bonuses 4:61 0 66:26 0 9053:9
Layers 1:61 2 0:62 1 3
Product Scope 4:49 3 4:45 1 86
Panel B: Firm/Industry-level Determinants - Explanatory Variables
Capital Employed 1049:62 128:1 10599:64 2 891409
Technology Adoption/GVA 0:03 0 5:69 0 2163
Assets 1540:61 192:4 15736:8 1:4 1200000
Input Tari¤s 69:95 46:95 49:17 17:34 202:02
Output Tari¤s 72:71 49:29 56:72 14:5 298:07
(ChM=TotalM)India 10:68 4:47 13:77 0:005 93:66
(InM=TotalM)US 14:22 12:03 11:68 0:007 100
Skill Intensity 0:26 0:25 0:07 0:04 0:71
Management Technology 2:41 2:48 0:60 0 3:17
Factories 3920:77 3315 3037:77 15 14486
Productivity 0:84 0:58 2:19 0:02 4:96
IT Expenditure 0:07 0 5:24 0 999:7
Consultancy Fees 8:13 0 217:53 0 46822:8
Notes: Annual data at the rm level, covering the period of 1990-2006. Monetary values are in real INR
Millions. Managerial Comp/Total Compis the share of managerial compensation in total labour
compensation. Managerial Compensationis the total managerial compensation. Number of Managersis
the total number of managers (middle plus top) in a rm. Non-Managerial Compensationis the total
non-managerial compensation. Managerial Wages, Non-Managerial Wages, Managerial Bonusesand
Non-Managerial Bonusesis the total managerial wages, total non-managerial wages, managerial bonuses
and non-managerial bonuses. Layersis the number of vertical or hierarchial layers.Product Scopeis the
number of products manufactured by a rm in a single year. Capital Employedis the amount of capital
employed by a rm. Technology Adoption/GVAis dened as the share of the sum of Research and
Development Expenditure and Royalty Payments for Technical Knowhow (Technology Transfer) in gross
value-added of a rm. Assetsis the total assets of a rm. Tari¤s (input and output)are at the 3-digit
NIC 2004. (ChM=TotalM)Indiais the share of Chinese imports in total imports of India.
(InM=TotalM)USis the share of Indian imports in total imports of the US. Skill Intensityis the ratio
of non-production workers to total employees at the 3-digit NIC 2004. Management Technologyis a
measure of management quality score obtained from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) at 2-digit NIC 2004.
Factoriesis the number of factories at 3-digit NIC 2004. Productivityis a rm level measure, estimated
following the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. IT Feesis the amount of within-rm expenditure
towards information technology services. Consultancy Feesis the amount of expenditure incurred by a
rm towards information technology services, but from external sources.
48




















































































Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0:50 0:50 0:50 0:50 0:41 0:95 0:95 0:48
N 62; 677 62; 677 62; 677 62; 677 56; 086 56; 081 56; 081 56; 086
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE(2-digit)*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns (1) (4) use share of of managerial compensation in total compensation as the dependent
variable.Columns (5), (6) and (7) uses the share of managerial compensation, share of skilled workers and
average factor size at period (t  2) and column (8) uses IPR02HighTechas the dependent variable.
IPR02 is a dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if year is greater than equal to 2002. HighTechis a
dummy variable which takes a value 1 if a rms expenditure on account of R&D Expenditure and
Technology Transfer before the year 2001, is greater than the median of the industry, to which the rm
belongs. IPR99is a dummy variable, which takes a value 1 if year is greater than equal to 1999.
HighTech
98
is a dummy variable which takes a value 1 if a rms expenditure on account of R&D
Expenditure and Technology Transfer before the year 1998, is greater than the median of the industry, to
which the rm belongs. (Mcomp/Tcomp)t 2is the share of managerial compensation at (t  2) period.
IPR02(t  4)is a dummy which is equal to 1 for all years that predate the reform by 4 or more years
and is equal to 0 in all other years. IPR02(t+ 4)dummy is equal to 1 for all years at least four years
after reform and 0 during other years. The other reform dummies are equal to 1 in specic years relative to
reform and 0 during other years. There is no dummy for the year immediately prior to the reform (i.e.,
year t  1); the coe¢ cients on the reform dummies provide estimates relative to that year. Capital
Employedis the total amount of capital used by a rm at t  1 period. Firm controls include age, age
squared of a rm and assets of a rm. Assetsis used as the size indicator at t  1 period. Both Capital
Employedand Assetsare expressed in their natural logarithmic form. Numbers in the parenthesis are
robust clustered standard errors at the rm level. All the regressions include the individual terms of the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We use an annual-based panel of Indian rms that covers up to 8,000+ rms, across 108 industries
within the manufacturing sector, over the period of 1990-2006 (with the exception of specic cases,
where specied so). Unless otherwise specied, variables are based on data from the PROWESS
database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). All monetary-based variables
measured in millions of Rupees, deated to 2005 using the industry-specic Wholesale Price Index
(derived from Allcott et al., 2016). All industry level cases are based on the 2004 National Industrial
Classication (NIC).
Variable denitions
1. Managerial compensation/Total compensation: Share of managerial compensation in
total labour compensation; compensation dened as the sum of all salaries, and additional bonuses.
2. Total Managers: Total number of managers in a rm. This is a sum of total number of
managers at the top and middle management level.
3. Average Managerial Compensation: Total managerial compensation divided by total
number of managers.
4. Managerial wage/Total wage: Share of managerial wage in total wage of a rm.
5. Managerial incentives/Total incentives: Share of incentives or bonuses in total incen-
tives of a rm. Incentives is a sum of bonuses or perquisites, commission, contribution to pension,
contribution to provident fund.
6. HighTech: It takes a value 1 if the average of R&D expenditure and royalty payments for
technical knowhow (technology transfer) is greater than the median of the industry average, to
which the rm belongs and zero otherwise.
7. IPR02: It takes a value 1 if year is greater than equal to 2002.
8. Horizontal Span of Control or Product Variety: The number of di¤erent varieties of
product produced by a rm.
9. Vertical Layers or Management Layers: The number of vertical layers 1, 2 or 3. We
assume a rm to have 2 layers throughout one management layer and non-managerial layer.
10. Capital employed: Total amount of capital employed by a rm.
11. Assets: Total assets of a rm. It is an indicator of size.
12. Age: Age of a rm in years.
13. Ownership: It indicates whether a rm is domestic-owned or foreign-owned.
14. Input/Output tari¤s: Input/output tari¤s at the 4-digit industry level, obtained from
Ahsan and Mitra (2014) for the period of 1990-2003, with the balance collected from Chakraborty
and Raveh (2018).
15. (ChM=TotalM)India: Share of Chinese imports in total imports of India. It is a measure
of import competition.
16. (InM=TotalM)US : Share of Indias exports to the US. It is a measure of export market
competition.
17. Skill intensity: The 3-digit industry level ratio of non-production workers to all employees,
obtained from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (2001-2006) and from Ghosh (2014) (1990-
2000).
18. Management Technology: The 4-digit industry level management quality score in 2004,
obtained from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010); the score is between 1 and 5, with 5 denoting the
highest quality.
19. Factories: The 3-digit industry level number of factories/plants.
59
20. Productivity: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at the rm-level is computed using the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.
21. Exporter/Non-Exporter: It takes a value 1 if a rms export earning is greater than
zero and 0 otherwise.
22. Intermediate/Final goods: These goods are classied according to the I-O table by
end-use. The intermediate goods category includes intermediates, capital and basic goods, whereas





































HighTech Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0:74 0:74 0:47 0:73
N 57; 461 57; 461 57; 461 57; 461
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE (5-digit)*Year Trend Yes No Yes Yes
Industry FE (2-digit)*Year FE No Yes No No
Notes: Columns (1) - (2), (3) and (4) use total managerial compensation, middle managers compensation
and top managers compensation of a rm, respectively as the dependent variable. IPR02is a dummy
variable, which takes a value 1 if year is greater than equal to 2002. HighTechis a dummy variable
which takes a value 1 if a rms expenditure on account of R&D Expenditure and Technology Transfer
before the year 2001, is greater than the median of the industry, to which the rm belongs. Capital
Employedis the total amount of capital used by a rm at t  1 period. Firm controls include age, age
squared of a rm and assets of a rm. Assetsis used as the size indicator at t  1 period. Both Capital
Employedand Assetsare expressed in their natural logarithmic form. Numbers in the parenthesis are
robust clustered standard errors at the rm level. Intercepts are not reported. c,b,a denotes 10%, 5% and
1% level of signicance, respectively.
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